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I. INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination law is a quite recent
development in Hong Kong. The employment provisions of
the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance were brought into force in
December 1996, while the Family Status Discrimination
Ordinance has been in force since November 1997. 1 Many in
the business community view the legislation, as well as the
associated Codes of Practice on Employment,' as an
unhealthy departure from Hong Kong's laissez-faire economic
policies. The laws are enforced largely through the Equal
Opportunities Commission ("EOC"), an independent body
established in 1996 and funded by the government. The Hong
Kong EOC has accomplished a good deal in its short life,
producing a large volume of educational materials, handling a
steadily increasing number of complaints, and litigating some
high-profile cases. There has, however, been substantial
debate within the community on the approach that the EOC
should take when exercising what many people view as its
primary statutory duty - to "endeavour to conciliate"
complaints.3
1. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, LAws OF HONG KONG ch. 480 (1997); Disability
Discrimination Ordinance, LAws OF HONG KONG ch. 487 (1997); Family Status
Discrimination Ordinance, LAws OF HONG KONG ch.527 (1997). The three ordinances
are also published on the website of the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities
Commission (EOC), available at <htpp://www.eoc.org.hk> (last visited Oct. 16,
2001). As Hong Kong now has a bilingual legal system, all laws are published in
both Chinese and English. The EOC website is also bilingual, as are most
educational materials produced by the EOC.
2. See Sex Discrimination Ordinance Code of Practice on Employment, IAws OF
HONG KONG ch. 480, § 69 (1997); Disability Discrimination Ordinance Code of
Practice on Employment, LAws OF HONG KONG ch. 487, § 65 (1997); Family Status
Discrimination Ordinance Code of Practice on Employment, IAWS OF HONG KONG ch.
527, §47 (1997) [hereinafter Codes of Practice]. The Codes of Practice are published
with their respective ordinances (as subsidiary legislation) in the Laws of Hong Kong.
They are also available on the website of the Hong Kong EOC, available at
<htpp://www.eoc.org.hk> (Last visited Oct. 16, 2001).
3. See LAws OF HONG KONG, ch. 480, §84(3)(b) (1997) (providing in cases of
alleged sex discrimination, the EOC shall "endeavour, by conciliation, to effect a
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This article reports the preliminary results of an ongoing
research project on the investigation and conciliation of
employment discrimination complaints in Hong Kong (which
is part of a broader study of the enforcement powers of the
Hong Kong EOC).4 The emphasis upon conciliation in Hong
Kong's legislative scheme reflects, to a large extent, the
influence of Australian legislation and experience, which the
Hong Kong EOC has relied upon extensively in its first five
years of operation. It has also been argued that conciliation
is consistent with the traditional Chinese preference for
resolving disputes through mediation and with Hong Kong's
laissez-faire economic policies. However, some local
organizations have been openly critical of the model, arguing
that it requires the EOC to play too "neutral" a role and thus
only perpetuates the power imbalance that the legislation
seeks to redress. Moreover, unlike Australia, Hong Kong has
never had a specialist tribunal to hear complaints of
discrimination. Thus, a complainant knows that if she does
not accept an offer in conciliation she must either abandon
her claim or litigate in the District Court, a slow and stressful
settlement of the matter to which the act relates"), available at <http://www.
eoc.org.hk/anti/anti.html> (last visited Nov. 18, 2001); Id. ch. 487, § 80(3)(b)
(providing similarly for cases of alleged disability discrimination); Id. ch. 527,
§62(3)(b) (providing similarly for cases of alleged family status discrimination).
4. The methodology of the complaints portion of the project is similar in many
respects to that used by Rosemary Hunter and Alice Leonard in their study of
conciliation of sex discrimination complaints in selected Australian jurisdictions.
See ROSEMARY HUNTER & ALICE LEONARD, THE OUTCOMES OF CONCILIATION IN SEX
DISCRIMINATION CASES (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law Working
Paper No. 8, August 1995). However, the Hong Kong study also includes complaints
filed under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance and seeks to incorporate certain
factors that are particularly relevant to Hong Kong.
5. For an interesting recent article on the origins of this preference, see Bobby
K. Y. Wong, Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution, 30 HONG KONG
L.J. 304 (2000). For an example of how certain commentators argued during the
enactment of Hong Kong's anti-discrimination legislation that the Japanese (largely
unenforceable) model of legislation would be more consistent with traditional
Chinese culture, see Ng Sek-hong, Employment and Human Rights in Hong Kong:
Some Recent Developments, 24 HONG KONG L.J. 108, 124-5 (1994).
6. See, e.g., The Frontier, Position Paper on the Initial Report on the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1999), available at <http://www.
hku.hk/cppl/cedaw/frontier.html> (last visited Nov. 18, 2001); Association for
Advancement of Feminism et al., Submission to the CEDAW Committee on the Initial
Report on Hong Kong Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women by Non-Governmental Organizations (1999)
(submission endorsed by 10 women's and human rights organizations), available at
<http:www.hku.hk/cppl/CEDAW4.html> (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
2001]1 629
630 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 5:627
process (and an expensive one unless the EOC grants legal
assistance). Hong Kong's trade union movement and the
general body of labour law are also quite weak.7  These
factors may further reduce the bargaining power of
complainants in the conciliation process.
Part II briefly reviews the legislative history of the laws
and their application to the field of employment. Part III
outlines the enforcement model adopted in Hong Kong and
the factors that influenced the decision not to create a
specialist tribunal to hear complaints that are not conciliated.
Part IV reviews the approach taken by the Hong Kong EOC
thus far to investigation and conciliation and the influence of
the Australian model (drawing largely upon preliminary
interviews with EOC staff and representatives of women's
organisations). Part V presents data on the numbers and
types of complaints filed in the first four years. Part VI
analyses the conciliation rate for various categories of cases
and the range of remedies that have been obtained through
conciliation. Part VII concludes by briefly outlining issues to
be studied in the next stage of this research project.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF HONG KONG'S EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws
As a British colony, Hong Kong was regarded as the
classic example of a laissez-faire economy. The government
pursued a policy known as "positive non-interventionism,"
meaning that it provided the infrastructure necessary for
industry and commerce, but refrained from enacting
legislation considered unduly burdensome to business. The
labor movement was weak and the absence of democracy
made it difficult for workers to lobby for law reform. The
Governor was appointed, as was the Executive Council, the
closest thing Hong Kong had to a cabinet. Prior to the
negotiation of the Joint Declaration,8 the treaty by which the
7. See Wilson W. S. Chow & Anne Carver, Employment and Trade Union Law:
Ideology and the Politics of Hong Kong Labour Law, in THE NEW LEGAL ORDER IN HONG
KONG 477 (Raymond Wacks, ed., 1999).
8. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984 (entered into force May 27, 1985).
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United Kingdom agreed to return Hong Kong to China in
1997, the legislature was also entirely appointed and
dominated by the business community.9 Thus, although
women's organisations lobbied for the enactment of anti-
discrimination legislation these demands were easily rejected.
The government's refusal to introduce any anti-discrimination
legislation arguably violated Hong Kong's obligations under
various international human rights conventions that applied
to it by virtue of the British government's ratification.o
However, the last years of the transition period leading to
Hong Kong's return to China (1989 to 1997) brought greater
awareness of human rights issues and greater opportunities
to lobby for law reform." In late 1989, in the wake of the
Tianamen Square massacre, the government proposed a Bill
of Rights for Hong Kong, which was enacted in 1991.12 The
Bill of Rights Ordinance was largely copied from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which
includes a right to equality) and gave greater legitimacy to
demands for specific anti-discrimination legislation. At the
same time, the pool of appointed legislators was widened (to
include some more liberal members) and a limited number of
directly elected legislators joined the Legislative Council. As a
result, the legislature became much more responsive to
public opinion and more willing to challenge established
government policies.13  Legislators also began drafting their
9. For discussion of Hong Kong's colonial government structure, see generally
NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG (5th ed. 1991); IAN
Scorr, POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN HONG KONG (1989).
10. For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination was ratified on behalf of Hong Kong in 1969, although Hong
Kong still does not have race discrimination legislation. For a discussion of Hong
Kong's obligation to legislate under this and other international treaties, see Andrew
Byrnes, Equality and Non-Discrimination, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG ch. 6
(Raymond Wacks, ed. 1992). It should be noted that the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was not applied
to Hong Kong until 1996. Although the British Government ratified CEDAW in 1986,
the Hong Kong government had previously asked the British government not to apply
CEDAW to Hong Kong. For a discussion of the political battle over CEDAW in Hong
Kong, see Carole J. Petersen, Equality as a Human Right: the Development of Anti-
Discrimination Law in Hong Kong, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 335, 363-66 (1996)
[hereinafter Petersen, Equality as a Human Right].
11. For further discussion of these events, see Petersen, Equality as a Human
Right, supra note 10, at 348-86.
12. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 383.
13. See KATHLEEN CHEEK-MILBY, A LEGISLATURE COMES OF AGE: HONG KONG'S
SEARCH FOR INFLUENCE AND IDENTITY (1995), especially ch. 7.
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own bills, which was almost unheard of in the pre-transition
period. One legislator, Anna Wu, introduced the Equal
Opportunities Bill ("EOB")14 which was based upon Western
Australian legislation and sought to prohibit discrimination
on a broad range of grounds, including race, sex, age,
disability, family status, and sexuality. Wu also drafted a
Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission Bill
("Commission Bill"),` which sought to establish an
independent commission to promote and protect human
rights and a specialist equal opportunities tribunal to resolve
complaints of discrimination.
The Governor used his constitutional powers to prevent
Wu from introducing her Commission Bill into the
legislature.16 However, he could not prevent the introduction
of the EOB, as it had been drafted so as not to have any
"revenue implications" for the government. Moreover, the
Democratic Party and several independent legislators had
promised to support the EOB and public consultation
exercises demonstrated substantial support for the concept of
anti-discrimination legislation. Fearing that Ms. Wu's EOB
might be enacted, the government introduced two competing
"compromise" bills, the Sex Discrimination Bill and the
Disability Discrimination Bill. While this strategy succeeded,
in that the government persuaded legislators not to vote for
Wu's broader bill, it required the government and pro-
business legislators to abandon their previous opposition to
all anti-discrimination legislation.
The Sex Discrimination Ordinance and the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance were thus enacted in 1995,
14. Equal Opportunities Bill 1994, HONG KONG GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, Legal
Supplement No. 3 (July 1, 1994).
15. Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission Bill 1994 (circulated for
public consultation, March 1994). Unlike the EOB, the Commission Bill was not
published in the GOVERNMENT GAZETTE because Governor Patten (Hong Kong's last
colonial governor) refused permission for it to be introduced into the Legislative
Council. However, the Commission Bill was published as an Appendix to Anna Wu,
Human Rights - Rumour Campaigns, Surveillance and Dirty Tricks and the Need for a
Human Rights Commission, in HONG KONG'S BILL OF RIGHTS: 1991-1994 AND BEYOND
73-80 (George Edwards & Andrew Byrnes eds., 1995).
16. Article XXIV of the Royal Instructions (which, together with the Letters
Patent, made up Hong Kong's colonial constitution) required that individual
legislators obtain the Governor's permission before introducing a bill that would
require public money, which a Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission
clearly would have required.
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although the employment provisions did not come into force
until the end of 1996. The two laws were amended, primarily
to improve remedies, by a bill enacted over the objections of
the government in June 1997. in the final days before China
resumed sovereignty.1 7 The Family Status Discrimination
Ordinance was also enacted in 1997. The new laws are an
interesting mix of English and Australian law. For example,
the Sex Discrimination Bill was largely copied from the
English Sex Discrimination Act 1975. However, certain
provisions were borrowed from Australian Law, while others
were drafted especially for Hong Kong. 18
One significant departure from the English model is in
the field of sexual harassment. The Sex Discrimination Act
1975 does not expressly prohibit sexual harassment,
although it has been interpreted by the English courts to do
so where it constitutes unlawful sex discrimination. At the
request of women's organisations, the Hong Kong government
agreed to follow the Australian model and the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance thus expressly defines and
prohibits sexual harassment. The government used
Australian federal legislation as its primary model for the
sexual harassment provisions.19 However, it also added some
additional language from Anna Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill
(which was based upon Western Australian law) to make it
clear that "hostile work environment" harassment is
17. Sex and Disability Discrimination (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance
1997, HONG KONG GOVERNMENT GAZETrE, Legal Supplement No. 1, Part I of II (June
27, 1997). For further discussion of the impact of these amendments on remedies for
discrimination see Carole J. Petersen, Hong Kong's First Anti-Discrimination Laws
and Their Potential Impact on the Employment Market, 27 HONG KONG L.J. 324 (1997)
[hereinafter Petersen, Hong Kong's First Anti-Discrimination Laws].
18. For further discussion of the scope and provisions of Hong Kong's anti-
discrimination ordinances, see Carole J. Petersen, Equal Opportunities: A New Field
of Law for Hong Kong, in THE NEW LEGAL ORDER IN HONG KONG, supra note 7
[hereinafter Petersen, A New Field of Law].
19. For an example of the application of the portion of Hong Kong's statutory
definition of sexual harassment that was borrowed from the Australian federal
legislation, see Yuen Sha Sha v. Tse Chi Pan [1999] 1 HKC 731, in which the act of
secretly filming a female university student while she undressed was held to be
unlawful "student-to-student" sexual harassment. The EOC granted the student
legal assistance and she successfully sued in the District Court. For analysis of why
the defendant's conduct satisfied Hong Kong's statutory definition of sexual
harassment, see Carole J. Petersen, Implementing Equality: An Analysis of Two
Recent Decisions Under Hong Kong's Anti-Discrimination Laws, 29 HONG KONG L.J.
179, 182-86 (1999) [hereinafter Petersen, Implementing Equality]. The precedent can
also be applied to employment cases.
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prohibited, even where the sexual conduct in question may
not have been "in relation" to the complainant.2 0
Although the new laws apply to many areas (including
education, housing, and the provision of goods and services),
employment is the most significant area and the majority of
the complaints received by the EOC to date fall within that
field. 21 The new laws have broad application in the field of
employment, protecting employees and prospective
employees, contract workers, commission agents, partners
and prospective partners (in firms of six or more). 22 The laws
impose vicarious liability on employers for the unlawful acts
of employees committed in the course of their employment.
However, the employer can avoid vicarious liability if it can
show that it took all reasonably practicable steps to prevent
the unlawful acts. In theory, this should give employers an
incentive to implement the recommendations in the three
Codes of Practice.2 4 Technically the Codes do not create
additional duties, but the court can refer to them when
deciding whether the employer has taken reasonable steps to
prevent unlawful acts.2 5 The Hong Kong legislation also
expressly prohibits victimization, which includes unfavour-
able treatment on the ground that a person has made a
complaint under one of the anti-discrimination ordinances,
provided evidence in proceedings relating to them, or alleged
facts that would amount to an unlawful act under one of the
ordinances.26
20. See LAws OF HONG KONG, ch. 480, §§ 23, 24 (1997). For a recent analysis of
Hong Kong's statutory definition of sexual harassment in the context of employment,
see Harriet Samuels, Sexual Harassment in Employment: Asian Values and the Law
in Hong Kong, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 432 (2000).
21. This section provides a very brief summary of the employment provisions. For
more detailed discussion, see Petersen, Hong Kong's First Anti-Discrimination Laws,
supra note 17. For a recent Court of Appeal decision interpreting several employment
provisions in the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, see Tsang v. Cathay Pac. Airways,
Ltd., CACV431/2001 (decided November 1, 2001) (holding that different mandatory
retirement ages for male and female flight attendants were unlawful).
22. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, §§ 11, 13, 15, 20, 36; Disability Discrimi-
nation Ordinance, § 11, 13, 15, 20; Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, §§ 8,
9, 11, 16,26.
23. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, § 46; Disability Discrimination Ordinance §
48; Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, § 34.
24. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
25. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, § 69(14); Disability Discrimination Ordinance,
§ 65(13); Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, § 47(2).
26. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, § 9; Disability Discrimination Ordinance § 7;
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There are certain weaknesses in the legislation. For
example, the definition of indirect discrimination is quite
narrow (particularly if the Hong Kong courts follow the
English cases interpreting similar statutory provisions) .27
However, on balance, the employment provisions are
reasonably strong, particularly in view of the longstanding
opposition to anti-discrimination law on the part of both the
government and the business community. Indeed, given the
dominance of the business community (and the fact that
Hong Kong still does not have full democracy), it is
remarkable that the government was persuaded to adopt this
legislation and to fund a public body to enforce it.
Subsequent attempts by Wu and other legislators to broaden
the scope of anti-discrimination legislation (for example, to
enact laws prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race,
age, and sexuality) failed." Under Hong Kong's current
constitutional order, as a Special Administrative Region of
China, the legislature has become less democratic than it was
at the end of the colonial period. Moreover, the constitutional
restrictions and voting procedures for bills proposed by
individual legislators are also more severe.29 Thus broader
anti-discrimination legislation will only be enacted if the Hong
Kong government and business community genuinely
Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, § 6.
27. The definition of indirect discrimination used in all three anti-discrimination
ordinances is limited to a "requirement or condition" which has been interpreted by
UK courts to require the complainant to identify a requirement or condition that was
an "absolute bar" to her hiring or promotion. See, e.g., Meer v. London Borough of
Tower Hamlets [1988] IRLR 399, 76 LGR 775 (Eng. C.A.); Perera v Civil Service
Commission, [1983] IRLR 166, [19831 ICR 428 (Eng. C.A.); as hiring and promotion
decisions are normally made upon a balance of criteria, this can be very difficult to
establish. Legislators Anna Wu (in 1995) and Christine Loh (in 1997) attempted to
amend this definition but their proposals were strongly opposed by the government
and were defeated.
28. For analysis of the unsuccessful campaign to legislate against sexuality
discrimination, see Carole Petersen, Values in Transition: The Development of the Gay
and Lesbian Rights Movement in Hong Kong, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 337
(1997).
29. For further discussion of the impact of these changes on the prospects for
anti-discrimination legislation, see Petersen, A New Field of Law, supra note 17, at
624-5. See also Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China (adopted on April 4, 1990 by the National People's
Congress and brought into force on July 1, 1997), at art. 74 (setting forth
restrictions on the types of bills that can be introduced by individual members of the
Legislative Council, as opposed to the government), Annex I (setting forth the voting
requirements for such bills).
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support it, which is highly unlikely in the near future.
III. HONG KONG'S ENFORCEMENT MODEL
When the various discrimination bills were being
considered by the legislature there was substantial debate on
the enforcement model that should be adopted. From the
start, it was suggested that a model that emphasised
conciliation would be appropriate for Hong Kong's cultural
and economic context. Indeed, some experts had argued that
Hong Kong should follow the example of Japan, where the
employment discrimination legislation initially lacked any
effective enforcement mechanism and relied instead upon
persuasion. As one Hong Kong academic argued at the time:
[The Japanese] Act has won approval as a vehicle of
"gradualistic" reform for being able to signal to the public,
especially the business community, the moral importance
of vindicating the rights of women at the workplace, while
remaining prudent enough to recognise traditionally
enshrined customs and practice, both in family and society.
In Hong Kong, there is no reason why similar prudence at
the normative level should not be exhibited, given our
Confucian heritage. While the present enthusiasm for human
rights should not stop at the factory gate, it is equally
important that the assiduous propagation of these standards
and values should not undermine or attempt to supplant
Chinese family values and traditions among those for whom
they are a cherished legacy.o
There is no question that Hong Kong employers would
have supported this approach. However, women's organisa-
tions were aware of the limited impact of the Japanese law
and they had already expressed their opposition to a similar
proposal based upon "persuasion" (which had been raised by
the government in the 1993 Green Paper on Equal
Opportunities for Men and Women).31 The women's movement
30. Ng Sek-hong, supra note 5, at 124-25.
31. The Green Paper on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (1993) was
issued by the Hong Kong government primarily as a way of delaying a more definitive
response to a motion passed by the Legislative Council in December 1992 calling for
the extension of the CEDAW convention to Hong Kong. Although officially a
consultation document, the government did its best in the Green Paper to portray sex
discrimination as an insignificant problem, which did not require legislation. At the
conclusion of the document (at Tl 137-40), the government discussed the possibility
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had also gained considerable support in the legislature.
Thus, by the 1994-95 legislative session, the Hong Kong
government knew that it had to propose something stronger
than moral persuasion if it was to serve as a viable alternative
to Anna Wu's EOB. It therefore agreed that the Sex
Discrimination Bill and Disability Discrimination Bill would
create legal duties and that their enforcement would be
supported by a publicly funded body.
Thus, although the Governor had used his powers under
the colonial constitution to prevent Wu from introducing her
own Commission Bill, the government then proposed its own,
more limited, Equal Opportunities Commission to assist in
the enforcement of the new laws. By so doing, the government
secured the support of Anna Wu for the its Sex
Discrimination Bill and Disability Discrimination Bill. Wu
agreed, in early 1995, to withdraw the sex and disability
provisions of her own EOB in favour of the government's two
bills. However, the government rejected Wu's proposal to
include broader "human rights" issues in the terms of
reference of the Commission. It also declined to create a
specialist equal opportunities tribunal to resolve complaints
under the new laws.3 2
The reluctance by the government to create a specialist
tribunal for discrimination complaints arose (in my view) from
the fact that the government, the business community, and
also some non-governmental organisations wanted
complaints to be settled primarily through a confidential
conciliation process rather than through an adversarial
process. Obviously, a confidential process will be preferred
by most respondents, particularly employers. However, it was
also argued that complainants, particularly victims of
disability discrimination and sexual harassment, would
prefer to resolve their complaints in a private, less adversarial
of adopting a non-enforceable "charter of rights for women. However, the majority
of public submissions supported the enactment of enforceable legislation, as well as
the extension of CEDAW to Hong Kong. For more discussion of the Green Paper
exercise, see Petersen, Equality as a Human Right, supra note 10, at 366-68.
32. There was some initial discussion of assigning employment discrimination
cases to the Labour Tribunal, an idea that might have appealed to employers but
probably not to employees and NGOs (as the Labour Tribunal is perceived by many
NGOs as being too pro-employer). In any event, it almost certainly could not have
fulfilled the role of a specialist equal opportunities tribunal.
20011 637
638 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 5:627
environment. It should be noted, however, that some women's
organizations challenged the assumption that Chinese
victims of discrimination would not wish to litigate and
insisted upon the right to file complaints directly in the
courts, without any obligation to engage in prior conciliation.
These women feared that the power imbalance might well be
perpetuated in conciliation, particularly if complainants were
not legally represented during conciliation meetings.
However, most women's organizations did support the
concept of an EOC that would investigate and conciliate
complaints, if only for the practical reason that they knew
that the courts would be inaccessible to most complainants.
The result was a compromise model, but one that has the
effect of discouraging litigation. Victims of discrimination and
harassment are not obligated to use the services of the EOC
or to participate in any prior conciliation. They may, if they
wish, file a complaint directly in the District Court. However,
most victims of discrimination cannot afford to retain a
lawyer, as Hong Kong has notoriously high legal fees and
almost no "legal clinics." Contingency fee arrangements are
not permitted. Moreover, even if a complainant could afford
to litigate, she would have to consider very carefully whether
it would be worth her while. There are no jury trials in Hong
Kong, except for serious criminal offences and defamation
actions, and plaintiffs cannot expect large damage awards. In
most litigation, a successful plaintiff can at least obtain an
award of costs, since Hong Kong normally follows the English
rule that "costs follow the event." However, the District Court
Ordinance provides (in Section 73) that in proceedings
brought under the anti-discrimination legislation each party
"shall bear its own costs unless the Court orders otherwise on
the ground that (a) the proceedings were brought maliciously
or frivolously; or (b) there are special circumstances which
warrant an award of costs."3 3 This provision was adopted to
remove the fear (among potential plaintiffs) of being ordered
to pay the defendant's legal costs should one's case not be
successful. However, it also means that a successful plaintiff
33. District Court Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG, ch. 236, § 73B(3) (in relation
to claims filed under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance); id. § 73C(3) (in relation to
claims filed under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance); icL § 73D(93) (in relation
to claims filed under the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance).
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cannot be certain that she will recover her costs, unless she
can demonstrate special circumstances.3 4
As a result of these factors, it was always understood that
most complainants would not try to litigate on their own but
rather would rely upon the free assistance provided by the
EOC. The legislation obligates the EOC to investigate and
"endeavour to conciliate" all complaints filed with it, except
for those that lack substance or can be discontinued on other
grounds provided by statute. Thus, although there is no
statutory requirement that a victim of discrimination attempt
to conciliate her complaint, in practice she is compelled to
participate in the conciliation process as long as the
respondent is willing to do so. If the complainant refuses to
participate in conciliation, or rejects what the EOC believes is
a reasonable offer, it is unlikely that the EOC will grant her
further assistance.
If conciliation fails then the complainant must either
abandon the claim or commence an action in the District
Court. At that stage the EOC can, but is not obligated to,
grant legal assistance to enable the complainant to litigate.
The EOC is careful not to give complainants the impression
that all meritorious cases will receive legal assistance.3 5
However, the complainant is expressly told (at the onset of
the process) that she cannot officially apply for legal
assistance from the EOC until after conciliation has failed.36
34. It should be noted, however, that the District Court has demonstrated a
willingness to award costs to successful plaintiffs, on the grounds of "special
circumstances", particularly if the court concludes that the defendant should have
conciliated the case. For a discussion of two cases in which costs were awarded on
the grounds of special circumstances, see Petersen, Implementing Equality, supra
note 19. Costs were also awarded in K, Y, and W v. Secretary for Justice, DCEO3, 4,
7/99, 694 H.K. Cu. (District Court, Sept. 27, 2000), in which the Hong Kong
government's longstanding (though previously secret) policy of refusing to hire a
person for any job in the disciplined services if s/he had a parent with a mental
illness was held unlawful under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance. The
government argued that costs should not be awarded because the litigation was the
first legal challenge to its hiring policy. However, the judge noted that special
circumstances could be found from the facts that (i) the government had been
advised by its own task force to change its policy; and (ii) the EOC, which supported
the complainants, has no separate budget for litigation.
35. In a brochure given to all parties, the EOC reminds parties that "legal
assistance is not guaranteed" and generally will only be granted if the case "raises a
question of principle; or it is unreasonable, because of the complexity of the case or
the applicant's position in relation to the respondent, to expect the applicant to deal
with the case unaided." What is Conciliation? 7 (Hong Kong EOC undated pamphlet).
36. The EOC informs parties that it "cannot entertain applications for legal
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From interviews with EOC staff, we know that in practice if a
complainant makes a special request she may be allowed,
before the conciliation stage is completed, to speak to the
EOC legal advisor about the procedures for applying for legal
assistance and the strength of the complaint. But this does
not normally occur. Moreover, the EOC legal advisor cannot
make any promises to the complainant in this regard, as the
ultimate decision as to whether to grant legal assistance is
made by the Commission itself. Thus, a complainant who
cannot afford to hire her own lawyer will not know when she
is considering an offer from the respondent whether she will
be in a position to pursue her complaint if she refuses the
offer and conciliation fails. Technically, the complainant can
also apply to the government's Legal Aid Department to
pursue her complaint in court. However, I am not aware of
any case in which a complainant has successfully applied for
legal aid to litigate a case under Hong Kong's discrimination
laws.
IV. THE HONG KONG EOC AND ITS APPROACH TO CONCILIATION
The legislation gave the government complete discretion
as to when to bring the new laws into force and it took the
position that the employment provisions could not come into
force until the EOC had been established and promulgated
the Codes of Practice to advise employers on their new
obligations. The government then took its time establishing
the EOC, failing even to advertise the post of Chairperson
until a full eight months after the legislation was enacted. As
a result, the first Chairperson did not take up the position
until May 1996, and the employment provisions did not come
into force until December 1996, a full eighteen months after
they were enacted. The first Chairperson, Dr. Fanny Cheung,
was a professor of psychology, who had a record of service on
behalf of women and the disabled but was not viewed as a
particularly assertive Chairperson. The government also
appointed several members to the EOC who either had no
prior track record in equality issues or had been openly
assistance unless the applicants have been through the complaints system and
conciliation has proved to be unsuccessful." Id.
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hostile to the concept of strong anti-discrimination
legislation." These appointments made women's organiza-
tions suspicious of the EOC and they regularly criticised it as
being a paper tiger during the first three years of operation."
In 1999, the government appeared to make an effort to
counter these charges, as it appointed Anna Wu (the original
proponent of the EOB) to be the new Chairperson of the EOC.
The appointment startled many people since Wu had already
demonstrated her willingness to challenge the government
and had the potential to be a real thorn in its side. Indeed,
since Wu assumed the Chairperson's position the EOC has
successfully sued the government for employment discrimi-
nation, obtaining significant damages for three plaintiffs who
had been fired or not hired for jobs in the Fire Services
Department and the Customs and Excise Department
because they each had a parent who suffered from mental
illness.39 The EOC also filed an application for judicial review
of the government's system of allocating secondary school
places to male and female students and obtained a
declaration from the court that the system is unlawful.4 0
The significance of Wu's appointment was not missed by
the business community. Indeed, one of its representatives
publicly expressed his concern that Anna Wu could be "bad
for business" because she would vigorously enforce the anti-
discrimination laws.4 1 However, statements such as these
probably overstate the impact of Wu's appointment -
37. See Roger Neill, Balance of Equality Body Questioned, EASTERN EXPRESS, May
9, 1996, at 5.
38. See HONG KONG COALITION ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES, BIANNUAL SUPERVISION
REPORT ON THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION (Original Chinese report and
summary English translation circulated to the Hong Kong Legislative Council as
Paper No. CB (2) 2349/96-97 (02)).
39. See K, Y, and W v. Secretary for Justice, supra note 33.
40. See Equal Opportunities Comm'n v. Director of Educ., HKAL 1555/2000
(decided June 22, 2001). The application for judicial review arose out of the EOC's
first formal investigation, in which the EOC found that the government has been
processing separately the applications of girls and boys to secondary schools. The
result of this process is that in most "school nets" in Hong Kong girls are required to
achieve higher results than boys to be admitted to the elitist secondary schools
(known as "band one" and "band two" schools"). See HONG KONG EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, FORMAL INVESTIGATION REPORT: SECONDARY SCHOOL PLACES
ALLOCATION (SSPA) SYSTEM (1999).
41. See May Sin-Mi Hong, Anna Wu Hits Back at Critic, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, August 9, 1999, at 4.
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although she is the only "full-time" member of the
Commission, she still needs the agreement of the other part-
time members, many of whom are quite conservative, for any
major policy moves. Moreover, Wu herself recognizes the
need to work with the Hong Kong business community and
has sought to reassure it by launching a new "partnership
with business" program that emphasises education and
training programmes. Of course, in the long run it is probably
inevitable that the EOC will be viewed as too aggressive by
the business community and too neutral by complainants
and NGOs.
The Hong Kong EOC has been strongly influenced by
Australian approaches to investigating and conciliating
complaints of unlawful discrimination. This influence can be
seen in the relevant subsidiary legislation, which draws
heavily from comparable provisions in the Australian federal
legislation. Similarly, the EOC's internal operating procedures
were initially based largely upon comparable Australian
federal procedures, although these procedures have since
been modified by the Hong Kong EOC legal adviser based
upon actual experience with the legislation. The Hong Kong
EOC has also brought in experts from Australia to conduct
training sessions for its officers and has sent certain officers
to visit Australian commissions for further training. This is
considered important because the formal mediation training
available in Hong Kong, which all EOC officers are expected
to complete, focuses on commercial mediation and therefore
is not completely relevant to the conciliation of discrimination
complaints.
Complaints filed with the EOC are received by one of two
divisions, the Gender Division, which receives complaints
under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and the Family
Status Discrimination Ordinance, and the Disability Division,
which receives complaints under the Disability Discrimina-
tion Ordinance. Each division has a "Division Head," who is
assisted by a "chief' and eight officers devoted to investigation
and conciliation. In general, the same officer who investigates
a complaint will also attempt to conciliate it. However, a
separate officer can be assigned to conciliate a complaint if
one of the parties feels that the investigating officer has
become biased against him.
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The Hong Kong EOC recently invited an Australian expert
to examine and comment upon its complaint files. This led to
the recommendation that Hong Kong EOC officers make more
of an effort to encourage "early conciliation" (before the
investigation stage is complete) as a means of resolving
complaints sooner and increasing the rate of successful
conciliation. The underlying theory behind this recommenda-
tion is that parties become more "hardened" in their positions
during the investigation process and thus less willing to
conciliate. Early conciliation also obviously reduces the time
that officers have to devote to the investigation process, a
consideration which has become important in the last year in
light of the increasing case-load, an issue that is discussed
further below. Beginning in October 2000 both the Disability
Division and the Gender Division provisionally adopted the
recommendation and started actively encouraging early
conciliation, although they are adopting slightly different
models, in terms of the distribution of the early conciliation
duties. The success of the program was assessed after the
first six months (October 2000-March 2001) and a significant
number of complaints had been resolved through early
conciliation. Both divisions have thus decided to continue to
offer early conciliation.
The officers I have interviewed thus far have generally
expressed support for the concept of early conciliation, both
because it can save time and because they believe that some
parties may be more willing to conciliate at an earlier stage.
However, some have expressed concern that they do not have
the opportunity to investigate the important facts in these
cases. Moreover, since only the statement of claim has been
prepared, an "early conciliation" conference can proceed with
very little information from the respondent. This may make it
difficult for the complainant to anticipate and prepare to
refute the arguments that the respondent will assert at the
conciliation conference.
In the early cases processed by the EOC, a large
percentage of parties did not conciliate in person but rather
used the EOC officer as a sort of messenger, passing the
offers and responses back and forth. From the point of view of
the officer, a conciliation meeting is more efficient as it allows
the parties to respond more quickly to one another.
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Moreover, face-to-face conciliation is more consistent with
what people expect of a mediation-based model of
enforcement. Thus, the EOC officers have been making a
concerted effort to encourage parties to attend conciliation
conferences and the percentage of cases conciliated in this
manner has increased. In the Gender Division, the officers I
interviewed estimated that a conciliation meeting is now held
in more than half of the cases that proceed to conciliation.
However, certain complainants, particularly those making
complaints of sexual harassment or disability harassment,
are not willing to meet the respondent and in such cases the
EOC officer continues to serve as the messenger.
The officers provide parties with written material
explaining the rules of conciliation and the role of the
investigation/conciliation officer.4 2 They also try to explain the
procedures orally to the parties. However, the officers
reported that many parties do not appear to fully understand
this information and make incorrect assumptions. For
example, although the brochure informs complainants that
the officer is required to be "impartial,"43 officers report that
complainants often expect them to serve as their advocates.
They also reported that complainants mistakenly assume
that the case is "established" once the officer has suggested
that it is ready to proceed to conciliation or that the case will
automatically go to a hearing if the conciliation attempt fails.
One of the challenges faced by the EOC is that Hong
Kong now has a bilingual legal system. This means that all
the legislation, the Codes of Practice, and procedural
materials are published in both Chinese and English.
However most legislation in Hong Kong, including the anti-
discrimination laws, tends to be drafted initially in English
and then translated into Chinese and people often comment
that the Chinese translations are not as clear as they should
be. Most of the educational and promotional materials that
the EOC produces are also published in both languages, as
are the EOC policy statements and conference papers. There
is no question that this adds considerably to the expense of
the EOC's operations, but it is absolutely essential in Hong
42. See, e.g., What is Conciliation?, supra note 35.
43. Id. at 4.
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Kong. The EOC investigation and conciliation officers also are
all bilingual.
The officers do generally meet separately with each party
and use "reality testing" techniques to try to persuade each
party to adopt realistic approaches. The officers will also ask
each party what its "bottom line" is, on the understanding
that the officer will not pass the information on to the other
party without permission. Of course, not all parties are
willing to trust the officer with this information and the
officers have reported that respondents are generally less
willing to provide it than complainants.
In complaints of employment discrimination, the
employer will often have legal representation and will almost
certainly send a fairly high-ranking manager to the
conciliation conference. In contrast, the complainant almost
never has legal representation in the conciliation stage,
although she is often accompanied by a relative or friend, or a
representative from an NGO or trade union. In any event,
she will very likely find herself attempting to conciliate with a
person who ranked higher than her in the company. Indeed,
he may well be her former supervisor and/or the person that
she alleges committed unlawful discrimination or harassment
against her.
As a result of this obvious power imbalance, and also the
public's perception of the purpose of the EOC, the
complainant often expects the EOC officer to play the role of
her "advocate" during the investigation and conciliation
process. However, the EOC's operating procedures require
that the officer act impartially during the conciliation of
complaints. Thus the officer must avoid conduct which could
give rise to a fear of bias. According to EOC officers,
respondents have not hesitated to accuse the EOC of failing
to maintain impartiality where they perceived that the officer
was advocating on behalf of the complainant or where they
suspected that the officer may have indicated to the
complainant that a particular offer was low and should not be
readily accepted.
An interesting observation made by several officers is that
complainants often express an initial desire to litigate their
claims, particularly if the litigation is funded by the EOC.
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This would seem to conflict with the common assumption
that Hong Kong Chinese prefer conciliation to an adversarial
process. The officers did note that this desire to litigate
sometimes fades when the complainant realizes what is
involved in litigation, not only the expense, but also the time
and stress of appearing in court. However, some officers
believe that a certain percentage of complainants (they
estimated as many as 20-30 percent) do not want only
compensation but also a hearing and a judgement. They
noted that it is difficult, and perhaps pointless, to try to
conciliate such cases and that a specialist tribunal would give
these complainants an opportunity to obtain the remedy that
they desire.
V. THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLAINTS FROM DECEMBER 1996
NOVEMBER 2000
A. Complaints for Investigation and Conciliation in All Fields
In the period from September 1996, when the non-
employment provisions of the legislation came into force,
until November 30, 2000, the EOC received a total of 2249
complaints, 1620 of which were for investigation and
conciliation.4 4 The EOC has experienced a steady increase in
the number of complaints. In its first sixteen months of
operation it received only 168 complaints for investigation
and conciliation. In that early period there was a concern
that people were not making use of the EOC and it actively
encouraged potential complainants to come forward. The
publicity has worked. The annual number of complaints
received for investigation and conciliation rose to 393 in 1998
and to 433 in 1999. In the first eleven months of 2000 the
EOC had already received 626 complaints for investigation
44. The 629 complaints which are not filed for "investigation and conciliation"
are classified as complaints for "follow-up action." For example, a person might
complain to the EOC about a discriminatory advertisement. Although the person
making the complaint probably will not have suffered any damages as a result of the
advertisement, the EOC can look into the matter and take follow-up action. The EOC
has frequently written to newspapers and has also litigated to enforce the provisions
prohibiting discriminatory job advertisements. See Equal Opportunities Commission
v. Apple Daily Ltd. [1999] 1 H.K.C. 202 (enforcing section 43 of the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance).
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and conciliation.
The steady increase in the rate of complaints received is a
serious concern of the EOC and its staff. Interviews with the
Directors of both divisions and with several officers indicate
that they feel an increasing pressure to complete cases more
quickly. One officer noted that during the second half of
2000 the agency received an average of more than sixty new
complaints per month, but resolved an average of only forty
cases per month. This is a worrying trend, since the two
divisions do not have the budget to expand the number of
officers devoted to investigation and conciliation. The EOC
has a "performance" target of completing 75 percent of all
cases within six months,4 5 but the officers I interviewed
expressed concern that they may not be able maintain this
target with the heavier caseload. Thus, the recent decision to
promote "early conciliation" of complaints (before the investi-
gation is completed) is to a large extent driven by
management's concern that staff will not be able to manage
the caseload if every complaint is fully investigated.
B. Employment-related Complaints for Investigation and
Conciliation
Although the laws apply to a broad range of activities
(including education, housing, and the provision of goods and
services), the vast majority of the complaints received for
investigation and conciliation were in the area of employment.
As of November 30, 2000, the EOC had been asked to
investigate a total of 1188 employment-related complaints,
representing 73 percent of the total complaints received for
investigation and conciliation.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the employment-related
complaints under the three ordinances There were 533
complaints filed under the Disability Discrimination
Ordinance. Of these, 460 (86 percent of the total) alleged
disability discrimination. Only sixty-nine complaints (13
percent) alleged disability harassment and only four alleged
discrimination by way of victimization (e.g., unfavourable
45. See EOC Performance Pledge 2000, available at <http://www.eoc.org.hk>
(last visited Oct. 16, 2001).
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treatment on the ground that the person made a complaint of
acts that are unlawful under the Disability Discrimination
Ordinance, prohibited under section 7).
There were 602 employment-related complaints filed
under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. However, a fairly
small number of these cases alleged pure sex discrimination
(119 complaints; 20 percent of the total). The largest category
of discrimination alleged under this ordinance was actually
pregnancy discrimination (229 complaints; 38 percent) and
the second largest category was sexual harassment (199
complaints; 33 percent). The EOC also received thirty-two
complaints of unlawful victimization (unfavourable treatment
on the ground that the person made a complaint of acts that
are unlawful under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance,
prohibited under section 9). The remaining twenty-three
complaints under this ordinance alleged marital status
discrimination.
The large number of complaints of pregnancy discrimina-
tion confirms what Hong Kong women's organiza- tions have
alleged for many years, that Hong Kong employers are loathe
to pay maternity leave and regularly fire women employees
who they suspect are pregnant. Employers are also regularly
accused of firing women soon after they return from their
maternity leave, apparently because they assume that a
woman with a small baby at home will not be able to perform
at the same level. It may also be that during the recent
recession in Hong Kong employers view the pregnancy of an
employee as an opportunity to replace her with a junior
person at a lower salary. The EOC made a special effort to
advise women of their rights when pregnant and has reported
a significant increase in complaints of pregnancy
discrimination in the past eighteen months.4 6
The Family Status Discrimination Ordinance was enacted
much later (in 1997) and is not a significant source of
complaints thus far. As of November 30, 2000, the EOC had
received a total of fifty-three employment-related complaints
under this Ordinance.
Out of the total of 1188 employment-related complaints
46. See Stella Lee, Alarm as Sex Bias Cases Rise by 78pc, SOUTH CHINA MOIRNING
PosT, February 1, 2000, at 1.
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received by November 30, 2000, 314 were still in the process
of being investigated or conciliated by EOC officers. Of these
pending complaints, most were filed with the EOC in the
calendar year 2000 and a significant number were not filed
until the later half of 2000. In calculating the percentages
noted in the next section (e.g. the discontinuation rate and
the conciliation rate), I have disregarded these cases entirely
and worked only with the 874 cases that had been brought to
some conclusion by November 30, 2000.
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TABLE 1
Status (as of November 30, 2000) of Employment-Related
Complaints filed with the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities
Commission from December 1996 - November 2000
Category Number of Number still Number of
Complaints Investigation Concluded
Filed or Conciliation Complaints
Disability
Discrimination 460 118 342
Disability
Harassment 69 6 63
Victimization
(DDO)47  4 3 1
Sub-total DDO 533 127 406
Sex
discrimination 119 20 99
Pregnancy
discrimination 229 77 152
Marital Status
Discrimination 23 5 18
Sexual
Harrassment 199 59 140
Victimization
(SDO)4 8 32 8 24
Sub-total SDO 602 169 433
Family Status
discrimination 53 18 35
Sub-total FDSO 4 9  53 1835
Total Employment
Field 1188 314 874
47. Refers to complaints filed pursuant to Section 7 of the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance.
48. Refers to complaints filed pursuant to Section 9 of the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance.
49. The Family Status Discrimination Ordinance also prohibits "victimization" (in
Section 6) but no complaints had been filed in this category as of November 30,
2000.
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VI. OUTCOMES OF CONCLUDED COMPLAINTS AND REMEDIES
OBTAINED THROUGH CONCILIATION
A. Discontinued Cases
Out of the 874 concluded employment-related cases, 441
never reached the conciliation stage. Of these cases, 111 are
classified as "early resolution," meaning that the complaint
was resolved early in the course of investigation. However, in
330 cases the complaint was not resolved but the EOC
nonetheless discontinued the investigation, either because
the complainant decided not to pursue it or because the EOC
decided that there were good grounds for discontinuation (e.g.
the complaint did not allege an unlawful act or was
considered by the EOC to be frivolous or lacking in
substance).
One goal of our research project is to assess samples of
these discontinued cases. We are particularly interested in
ascertaining why the rate of discontinuation for reasons other
than early resolution is so much higher among cases filed
under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (177 out of a
total of 406 concluded cases, or 44 percent) than it is among
cases filed under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (135 out
of 433 concluded cases, or 31 percent). One explanation
offered by some EOC officers in preliminary interviews (which
we will seek to test), is that a significant number (as much as
10-15 percent) of the complaints filed under the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance clearly lack any substance and can
be discontinued at the intake stage.
Table 2 shows the outcomes of the 874 employment-
related complaints that had been concluded as of November
30, 2000.
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B. Conciliation
In 433 of the 874 concluded cases filed under the three
ordinances the complaint proceeded to the conciliation stage.
In 238 of these 433 cases conciliation was successful. This
means that just under 50 percent of the complaints are
proceeding to the conciliation stage and that about 55
percent of those complaints are successfully conciliated. This
generates a conciliation rate of approximately 27 percent of
the concluded employment-related cases.
It should be noted that in the employment field the rate
of conciliation varies significantly depending upon what
ordinance the complaint was brought under. For example,
the conciliation rate, as a percentage of concluded cases, is
35 percent for employment-related cases brought under the
Sex Discrimination Ordinance, but only 20 percent for
employment-related cases brought under the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance. The conciliation rate for employ-
ment-related cases brought under the Family Status Dis-
crimination Ordinance is only 11 percent. However, since
there were only thirty-five concluded cases under the Family
Status Discrimination Ordinance as of November 30, 2000, it
is difficult to draw any conclusions about those cases.
Employment-related complaints brought under the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance were more likely to proceed to the
conciliation stage and also more likely to successfully
conciliate than those brought under the other two
ordinances. For example, conciliation was attempted in 245
(57 percent) of the 433 concluded cases under the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance. In contrast, conciliation was
attempted in 177 (44 percent) of the 406 concluded cases
filed under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance. Of the
245 Sex Discrimination Ordinance cases that proceeded to
conciliation, 151 (62 percent) were conciliated, whereas only
83 of the 177 disability cases (47 percent) that proceeded to
conciliation were conciliated.
However, when we examine cases in all areas, as opposed
to just employment cases, the rate of conciliation for
disability and gender-related cases is much closer. The
conciliation rate, as a percentage of concluded cases in all
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fields, was 37 percent for cases filed under the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance and 32 percent for cases under the
Disability Discrimination Ordinance. When we look at the
success rate of attempts to conciliate we also find that the
rate is quite similar, about 62percent, for the two ordinances
when employment and non-employment cases are combined.
Thus it is only in the employment field that the disability
cases have a significantly lower conciliation rate. We have
not yet drawn any conclusions about the reasons for this.
However, we have postulated certain theories that we will
attempt to test as part of the research. For example, it may
be that the prejudices associated with disabilities are
stronger than those related to gender and also more hurtful,
making both sides less willing to compromise. It may also be
that a woman who was unlawfully dismissed as a result of
sexual harassment or pregnancy has a better chance than a
person with a disability of locating a new job, allowing her to
mitigate her damages. This should make it easier for the
parties to agree upon monetary compensation. Moreover, a
complainant who has secured a new job would presumably
have a greater interest in conciliating the complaint quickly,
so that it would not interfere with her new job.
C. Range of Remedies Obtained in Complaints Filed Under the
Sex Discrimination Ordinance
One of the main criticisms that is often made of a
conciliation model is that the conciliation terms tend to
provide inadequate compensation. Moreover, in Hong Kong,
where there is no specialist tribunal to hear cases that are
not conciliated and where the barriers to litigation are quite
high, the complainants may feel especially pressured to
accept low offers.
We have started our analysis of remedies in employment
discrimination cases with the complaints filed under the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance, where the conciliation rate was
the highest. (We have not yet studied the remedies obtained
in the conciliated disability cases.) As indicated in Table 1,
most of the complaints filed under the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance fall within three main categories: sex discrimina-
tion; pregnancy discrimination; and sexual harassment.
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While our analysis is still ongoing, we can make the following
provisional observations regarding the range of remedies
obtained through conciliation in cases completed as of mid-
2000.
1. The Likelihood of Obtaining Monetary Compensation.
There is a marked difference among the three main categories
of cases filed under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. The
pregnancy discrimination data-base includes, by far, the
largest number of cases in which monetary compensation
was part of the conciliation terms. The sexual harassment
category has the second-highest category in terms of the
frequency of monetary compensation. In contrast, we have
found very few pure sex discrimination cases that were
conciliated for monetary compensation. It should be noted,
however, that there are relatively few conciliated sex
discrimination cases in which the complainant alleged that
s/he lost an existing job due to the discrimination, whereas
there are numerous such cases in the conciliated pregnancy
discrimination and sexual harassment categories.
2. Alternatives to Monetary Compensation. Other common
remedies in the data-base include: a good reference letter; a
change to the "testimonial" so as to remove the stigma of
being dismissed; and/or a formal apology. From the
employer's point of view, these are inexpensive ways to settle
cases but such remedies are not always easy to agree upon.
For example, in some cases the employee has demanded that
the respondent provide a reference letter stating that the
complainant resigned of her own accord, despite the fact that
she was actually dismissed. A formal apology may also be
difficult to obtain, especially if the employer originally insisted
that the complainant was dismissed for poor performance.
3. The Amount of Monetary Compensation Paid. As of
November 2000, the largest amount of monetary
compensation obtained through conciliation by the EOC was
HK$600,000 (approximately US $77,000), in a case of
pregnancy discrimination. However, this was the only case we
examined in which compensation over HK$200,000 was
obtained through conciliation. There were also several cases
in the HK$100,000 200,000 category, but the majority of
cases were conciliated for less than HK$100,000
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(approximately US$13,000).
4. Impact of the Category of Case on the Amount of
Compensation. When we compare the pregnancy cases and
the sexual harassment cases in which monetary compensa-
tion was part of conciliation terms, we find that the awards
tend to be higher in the pregnancy cases. This is true even
when we focus on the sexual harassment cases in which the
complainant alleged that she was dismissed or resigned as a
result of the harassment.
We have examined several case files for complaints of
pregnancy discrimination that were successfully conciliated
for monetary compensation. From these files, we can identify
certain factors that may account for the greater chance of
obtaining monetary compensation and the larger amounts
obtained. First, in several of the pregnancy discrimination
cases, the complainant had provided the EOC with a
reasonable amount of documentary evidence supporting her
claim. A common pattern is that the employee received
positive written reviews for several years, but then returned
from maternity leave only to receive (sometimes in a matter of
days) a written "warning" telling her that she must work
harder, make fewer mistakes, spend less time on personal
telephone calls, or show a better attitude. This is often
followed by a memo of protest by the employee, further
warnings, and then ultimately dismissal, all within a
remarkably short period of time. The complainant often
alleged that her former supervisor had strongly urged her to
resign, indicating that if she did so the employer would
provide her with a good reference letter. Of course there is
rarely documentary evidence of such conversations. However
complainants can often name other former employees who
had been dismissed, or persuaded to "resign, " when they
were pregnant or returned from maternity leave, thus
providing witnesses that the EOC officer can contact. When
confronted with such evidence the employer may well decide
that it would be wise to offer a settlement.o
50. Another factor which may influence employers (and needs further study) is
that in several cases the complainant also had filed a related complaint (under the
Employment Ordinance) in the Labour Tribunal, and the EOC conciliation agreement
sometimes settled that claim as well. Although the Labour Tribunal is not known as
being particularly sympathetic to employees, the opportunity to settle both claims at
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In contrast, in the conciliated cases that I have examined
in which pure "sex discrimination" was alleged, there was
generally far less documentary evidence. In these cases, the
complainant generally was not an existing or former employee
but rather a job applicant who alleged that the employer or
one of its staff stated that he could not apply for a particular
job on the ground of his sex. I use the term his sex because
in more than half of the conciliated sex discrimination cases I
have examined thus far the complainant was a man and the
employer was alleged to have told him that the job was only
for women. Of course, it is very difficult to prove such claims
or to establish damages. In several of these cases the
conciliation agreement was simply an apology, an explanation
that the employer did not intend to discriminate, or the
promise of an interview with no commitment to hire.
However, recently the EOC has received a significant
number of sex discrimination complaints from women, who
are either existing or former employees of the respondents.
These cases appear to have stronger evidence of both
discrimination and damages than most of the early sex
discrimination cases that have been successfully conciliated.
Thus there is a greater chance of obtaining monetary
compensation in conciliation. When these cases are factored
in to our data-base, our provisional observations on this
category of cases may change.
VII. THE NEXT STAGE OF THE RESEARCH PLAN
The next stage of the project is to select a representative
sample of cases in the four main categories (sex discrimi-
nation, pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, and
disability discrimination) and perform a quantitative analysis
of the factors that may have influenced the outcomes. When
the data becomes available, we will also pay special attention
to the EOC's use of "early conciliation," comparing it to the
approach followed prior to October 2000 under which
conciliation was not normally encouraged until after the
investigation was completed.
The results of the interviews done to date do call into
once would obviously be attractive to the employer.
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question the assumption that Hong Kong Chinese have a
particularly strong desire to conciliate, rather than litigate,
their complaints of employment discrimination. We need to
interview actual complainants, at various stages of the
process, to ascertain their preferences and the assumptions
that underlie them. If the observation made by the EOC
officers we interviewed that complainants tend to desire a
hearing initially and only change their mind when they fully
appreciate the stresses and strains of litigation is correct,
then it may be that Hong Kong Chinese complainants are not
that different in this respect from their counterparts in more
"western" societies.
We also plan to interview other EOC officers and selected
complainants. We hope to interview respondents as well but
may have to settle for interviewing representatives of
employer organizations. It is clear that there is substantial
disagreement between the complainants and the respondents
as to what the EOC officer's role should be. From the point of
view of respondents, the procedure is only fair if the officer is
entirely objective and "neutral." However, from the point of
view of the women's and disability rights groups, this defeats
the purpose of the legislation and of establishing the EOC. It
may be that certain devises can be created to address the
power imbalance without sacrificing the objectivity of
conciliator. For example, the EOC might consider appointing
certain officers to act as advocates, particularly in cases in
which the complainant was formerly a fairly junior employee
and is attempting to conciliate with a company's manager or
legal officer. Of course, this would have resource implications
and may be impossible as the EOC is increasingly overloaded
with pending cases.
We plan to publish the final results of this study in a
format that will be accessible to the Hong Kong community.
One of the complaints often made by women's organizations
is that the EOC is not sufficiently "transparent." Actually, in
many respects the EOC is probably one of the most
transparent public bodies in Hong Kong. It publishes an
enormous quantity of promotional and educational material,
holds many public events, and is frequently in the news. Yet
the data that many women's and disability groups really want
to see - the outcomes of most of the complaints - is kept
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confidential. The EOC does publish, in its annual reports5'
and its quarterly newsletter,5 2 the results of a limited number
of conciliated cases, with the names and details changed.
However, this does not seem to give NGOs the sense that they
really understand what is happening to the large bulk of
cases. Given that there is no specialist tribunal and very few
cases go to court, it is important that the community have
certain information on the success rate of complaints as a
whole, the types of complaints that tend to succeed, the
range of remedies obtained in conciliation, and the factors
that may influence whether a case is successfully conciliated.
51. See, e.g., EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 1998/99.
52. EOC NEWS.
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